

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 24 April 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. K. KURKA

(Czechoslovakia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO
Mr. J. MACHADO LOPES
Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. J. BLAZIK

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU
Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. S. LÖFGREN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV
Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S.F. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. M.A. VELLÒDI

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): I declare open the one hundred and twenty-fourth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): Several weeks have elapsed since our Committee resumed discussion of the question of general and complete disarmament. In accordance with the recommendation of our co-Chairmen, this discussion is devoted to item 5(b) of the agenda (ENDC/1/Add.3): disarmament measures in regard to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

The attention of the Committee has centred on the proposal made by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, on 22 September 1962 in the General Assembly of the United Nations (A/PV/1127, provisional, pp. 38-40), and since incorporated in the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1).

As we know, this proposal provides for the elimination of armed forces and the destruction of all missiles which might serve as vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons, except for an agreed and strictly-limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft ground-to-air missiles, which the Soviet Union and the United States would retain exclusively in their own territories until the end of the second stage.

It seems to me that the time devoted by the Committee to this Soviet proposal is in keeping with its importance. There can be no doubt that it represents a genuine attempt to break the deadlock in our negotiations, by offering a solution that should be acceptable to all concerned for the key problem of general and complete disarmament: the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. We note with regret, however, that the discussion we have so far had on this subject is not developing on lines foreshadowing the possibility of an agreement.

It is true, Mr. Chairman, that the representatives of the Western Powers have often proclaimed their interest in this proposal. But they have at the same time adopted tactics which prevent positive discussion of the problems entailed in its realization. At times they maintain a reserve which they try to justify by alleging a lack of clarity in the proposal; at other times they demand clarifications mostly related to problems which have little in common with the substance of the proposal.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

The Western delegations also try to raise more general objections to the Soviet proposal. In the forefront is the argument that the implementation of the Soviet proposal would destroy the balance of forces.

The Polish delegation does not intend to start a new discussion here on that idea, which the Western Powers bandy about so freely and arbitrarily. But we must object to the interpretation which the Western Powers are now putting on paragraph 5 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations; and, to avoid any misunderstanding, I shall take the liberty of re-reading that paragraph:

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all." (ENDC/5, p.2)

The principle therefore contains no reference to balance of military forces. On the contrary, it is based on the concept of balance of security. Now, balance of security can be achieved through the application of all kinds of measures intended to remove from international relations all factors that might endanger the security of States. So balance of security presupposes disarmament; it is strengthened and consolidated as disarmament proceeds.

On the other hand, the balance-of-forces advocates cannot escape the inherent contradiction between the search for security through force and the very essence of disarmament. Balance of security is therefore not to be confused with balance of forces. These are two contradictory concepts.

The fact that a disarmament plan cannot be based on the concept of balance of forces is recognized by United States diplomacy also. Here is what was said on the subject by no less an authority than Mr. John Foster Dulles -- I quote from a speech he made on 22 July 1957:

(continued in English)

"It is not practical to invent some formula which would measure accurately the military power of the Soviet bloc, on the one hand, and the United States and its allies, on the other hand ... Armaments and military 'potentials' are so complex that it is not possible to arrive at dependable equations. We know that we cannot find any formula to provide a dependable balance of military power." (Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959, Department of State Publication 7008, p. 828).

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

(continued in French)

Obviously, in urging my own interpretation of paragraph 5 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, I am very well aware that this is not just a difference of semantics, since the balance-of-forces concept hides practical measures which are bound to raise serious objections. The quest for a balance of forces justifies arbitrary acts; it serves as a pretext for accelerating the armaments race and taking military measures which endanger others' security.

Since the end of the Second World War the Western Powers have resorted in their policy to the balance-of-forces theory in order to undertake a whole series of military measures directed against the socialist countries.

How, in fact, can we interpret otherwise the encirclement of the socialist countries with a network of military bases equipped with offensive nuclear weapons? How otherwise explain the conclusion of a series of military and political pacts directed against these countries? Can any valid justification be found for the dispatch to the socialist countries' borders by the United States of aircraft carrying atomic weapons, or submarines equipped with nuclear warhead missiles? Lastly, is any other interpretation possible of the creation of a multilateral atomic force which gives access to atomic weapons to more countries, including those which, like the Federal Republic of Germany, are pursuing a policy inimical to peace?

The Western representatives try to convince us that the formation of a multilateral force - or of its new variant, the inter-allied atomic force - will not lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons and does not affect the security of the socialist countries. But these are mere words that carry no conviction for us, especially as the assertions are daily belied by the facts. The Western representatives cannot deny the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany is using every means to obtain access to atomic weapons, though it has no need of them for its defence, since no one is threatening it. The great efforts it is making to that end are explained by the fact that in the possession of atomic weapons the militarists of the Federal Republic see a powerful means of implementing their policy of revenge.

We are bound also to note that the Western Powers, and in particular the United States, are busy preparing the ground for equipping the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons. We shall go on repeating - even at the risk of annoying Mr. Cavalletti, Mr. Godber and Mr. Stelle - that the course on which the Western Powers seem to be embarking is sure to make for renewed international tension. Nor shall we cease to denounce the policy which the Western Powers seem to be pursuing, because it dangerously

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affects the interests of world peace. It will take something more than words to allay the apprehensions which that policy is instilling in the public mind the world over.

The danger represented by the nuclear armaments race and the existence of enormous stockpiles of these weapons of mass destruction is not static. It is dynamic. It is fed by the armaments race. It grows with the unilateral measures taken by the Western Powers, which tend to proliferate nuclear weapons and to involve other countries in the armaments race. If we want to deal with the danger, we must envisage radical disarmament measures. That is the sine qua non for their effectiveness.

We have three methods to choose from. The first, proposed by the socialist Powers (ENDC/2) provides for the complete elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles from the first stage of disarmament, and the decisive elimination of the danger of a nuclear war from the start of the disarmament process.

The second method, advocated by the Western Powers (ENDC/3C) provides for a percentage reduction spread over all the stages of disarmament. We have already often had occasion to show that the Western Powers' method disregards the fact that in the present situation a percentage reduction cannot produce the desired effect, just as it cannot eliminate the possibilities of a nuclear war inherent in the existence of enormous quantities of nuclear weapons in State arsenals. The method of percentage reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles leaves States until the end of the disarmament process with sufficient military potential to carry out nuclear aggression. Nor can it reduce the dangers for other States in movements of nuclear weapons and missiles. We are of the opinion that a disarmament programme must provide from the very first stage for such armament levels as will ensure that the armaments can serve only purely defensive purposes.

The search for criteria whereby to make an adequate assessment of the military potential with which States should be left during the disarmament process has always been one of the most important factors in international discussions on disarmament.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to quote here an opinion on this subject expressed by the former United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson, as head of the United States delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1951. The following is an excerpt, and in my view a very pertinent one, from a speech he made on 19 November 1951 in the First Committee of the General Assembly:

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(continued in English)

"In the past, and at the present time, all sorts of factors have been mentioned which bear upon the armed forces which a nation might legitimately have - factors such as the geographical position, the area of the country, the nature of the terrain, the length of its sea coasts and borders, whether its frontiers are protected by natural barriers, and the size of its population, and the amount of natural resources, communication system, and size of industrial plants.

"Now, as you see, when you begin dealing with vast factors of that sort, one arrives only at utter confusion. Therefore the task is to find some criterion which has a certain general application and from which one can make specific agreement as to specific countries.

"An important way to deal with it is to say what we are trying to achieve here: that is, an agreement which will restrict the forces of certain countries to what is adequate for their defence and no more. Because, if the forces are adequate for defence only, there is real assurance that they are not designed and intended for aggression."

(continued in French)

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that no better refutation is imaginable of the United States delegation's present position in our Committee. Incidentally, that was the time when the Soviet Union was advocating a method of percentage reduction in armaments, which the Western Powers violently opposed.

The third method of solving the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is that contained in the proposal by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko (A/PV.1127, provisional, pp.38-40). I think it should be clear to everyone that with the different approaches of the two sides to the problem there is no possibility of an agreement based on their earlier positions. Only the new Soviet proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1) gives us a chance to produce an acceptable formula taking equal account of the interests and needs of all the States concerned.

It is up to the Western Powers to take advantage of that chance. We are bound nevertheless to note that, although it represents a step to meet them, the Western Powers have so far made no constructive contribution to our discussion. The best illustration of this negative attitude is to be found in the statements made by the United Kingdom and the United States representatives of our Committee's last two meetings on the problem of general and complete disarmament.

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It was with some surprise that we heard the United Kingdom delegation's attempts to prove that there is no difference between the new Soviet proposal and the Western Powers' position. On 10 April Mr. Godber said:

"... the Soviet Union is now prepared to accept a programme of disarmament during the greater part of which the peace of the world would be maintained by exactly the same method as it is at present, namely, by the balance of deterrent power". (ENDC/PV.120, p.15)

It would be hard to imagine a more clear-cut example of distortion of the meaning of the Soviet proposal. It is difficult to believe that the representatives of the Western Powers do not understand that there is a fundamental difference between the positions of the two sides.

What the Soviet Union proposes is that a certain strictly agreed number of missiles be left for a limited time - that is, until the end of the second stage of disarmament - in specific territories: that is to say, in the United States and the Soviet Union. By contrast the Western plan provides, with no time-limit set - that is to say, until the end of disarmament - nor any territorial limits, for the retention of a number of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, in no way justified by defence needs but making it possible to unleash a nuclear aggression of considerable destructive force.

We were also surprised to hear the arguments alleging intrinsic contradictions in the new Soviet proposal for the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Certain Western representatives find a contradiction between the new Gromyko proposal and the principle of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament stated in the Soviet plan.

It must nevertheless be noted that the spirit behind both the new Soviet proposal and the Soviet disarmament programme as a whole remains the same. The aim is to eliminate the danger of a nuclear war in the very first stage of disarmament. The Soviet Union's reason for consenting to modify somewhat the proposed methods of implementing that principle was its desire to facilitate agreement.

The Soviet delegation has also been reproached with advocating in its new proposal the retention not only of intercontinental missiles but also of means of defence such as ground-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft missiles. According to the United Kingdom delegation, this is apparently at variance with the concept of a stabilized deterrent force.

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Obviously everything depends on the objectives assigned to the atomic potential to be retained by the two Powers. In the Soviet view, that potential would permit them to counter any aggression and at the same time give them the indispensable means of defence against a surprise attack. The retention of these means of defence would thus provide an additional safeguard against possible violation of the disarmament agreement as well as against the possibility that one of the parties might wish to use its retained missiles for aggressive purposes.

From the standpoint of defensive strategy, therefore, there is no contradiction. A contradiction appears only if the atomic potential left in the hands of the two Powers is regarded as a means of exerting pressure, and if the deterrent force is regarded as an instrument of nuclear aggression. But that has nothing to do with the Soviet proposal.

I must admit that the attitude of the Western Powers is really difficult to understand. The members of this Committee will recall that it was precisely the Western delegations, and particularly the United Kingdom delegation, which expressed fears that the implementation of the Soviet plan for the total elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the very first stage would deprive them of their means of defence while the means would still be available for a surprise attack with multi-purpose weapons, and even by makeshift methods. Now that the Soviet Union is offering them a formula which makes full allowance for that kind of apprehension, these delegations, instead of supporting the formula, are trying to avoid a serious discussion by distorting its meaning.

We must unfortunately point out that such an attitude reflects the general tactics of the Western Powers in our Committee. We have regularly to listen to comments on the socialist countries' inflexibility and lack of conciliatory spirit. But have the Western Powers put forward a new idea that would modify their former attitude? No. The Western representatives complain that we take no account of their position. But have they submitted any new proposals which would take our objections and our desires into consideration? No. And that is not all. When the socialist countries put forward ideas based on the Western delegations' views, these delegations beat a hasty retreat, invent new difficulties and demand further concessions.

If the Western delegations want a serious discussion on Mr. Gromyko's proposal, there is nothing to prevent them from giving their own opinions on, for example, the number of missiles and the methods of control to be applied in implementing the proposal.

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As the socialist countries are also interested in obtaining clarifications from the Western delegations, I should like to ask them three questions. These are very simple and can be answered by a "Yes" or a "No".

First, do you agree that what you call "atomic protection" should consist of an equal number of missiles kept by the two sides?

Secondly, do you agree that this "atomic protection" should be abolished at an agreed moment, but well before the end of the process of general and complete disarmament?

Thirdly, would you be prepared to accept the Gromyko proposal provided that a system of control acceptable to all were worked out jointly?

The Polish delegation is profoundly convinced that we can achieve progress only by discussing practical questions. I support the Brazilian delegation's appeal to us (ENDC/PV.121, pp.5 et seq.) to start real negotiations. I hope that the Western delegations, too, will not remain unresponsive to that appeal.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): I have no more speakers on my list. Does any other representative wish to speak this morning? I call on the representative of the Soviet Union.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The fact that there are no further speakers on this extremely important question, the fact that the representatives of the Western Powers are keeping silent and not giving their answer to the Soviet proposal, are in themselves naturally not an encouraging sign if we are to conduct effective negotiations aimed at adopting effective disarmament measures. We realize the delicacy of the position of the Western Powers, and this silence of theirs is perhaps more eloquent than any statement.

Demands for disarmament are becoming **even** more determined throughout the world and are acquiring an ever more specific character, and, if course, in the world you will find very few people who are satisfied with the state of the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Many are beginning to realize that the Western Powers in the Committee are being obstructive; they willingly beat the air, but they do not want to agree to specific, real disarmament measures. Today the Western Powers are stubbornly keeping silent, as though they have already said their say and have nothing to add. The Western Powers refuse to say whether they are prepared to accept the Soviet proposal for the destruction in stage I of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons a strictly-limited minimum number to be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of stage II. The silence of the Western

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Powers on this question gives, of course, every ground to conclude that they are neither prepared nor willing to agree to real disarmament measures.

After the resumption of our discussion on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet delegation put forward some considerations and replied to a number of questions on the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1), on a number of the articles and provisions of this treaty, on the proposal for the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and military bases in stage I of disarmament, and also on the United States outline for general and complete disarmament (ENDC/30). We listened to a number of statements by members of our Committee, including representatives of the Western States.

This discussion showed that the Western representatives, Mr. Stelle, Mr. Godber, Sir Paul Mason and others, in their statements at a whole series of previous meetings, preferred to raise all sorts of questions rather than engage in constructive work. Some of these were questions of substance, but most of them had no direct bearing on the issues under discussion. The representatives of the Western Powers devised such questions and formulated them in such a way that it was clear to everyone that the purpose of these questions was to reject the proposals of the Soviet Union. In doing so they used such arguments as, for example, that this proposal would weaken the security of the Western Powers, would upset the military balance, and so on.

Having once put forward these arguments, they have never made any effort or attempt to reveal the gist of these arguments: that is, what they mean when they express the unacceptability to them of the Soviet proposal in such terms as "upsetting the military balance" or "weakening security". How, for example, did the United States representatives argue that our proposal on the liquidation of United States military bases on foreign territory was unacceptable to them? They asserted out of hand that it would disturb security. But allow me to ask what the United States representatives mean by security. Apparently you consider that your security means training your weapons on the Soviet Union and the other socialist States from your bases on foreign territory? that is not security; it is the policy "from a position of strength", the policy of threats.

We are not afraid of threats, and to any attempt to use force we shall reply with an annihilating blow. But we consider that such a state of relations between States cannot be tolerated. We consider that it is necessary to disarm, and that this must be done quickly, resolutely and properly before it is too late.

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The Western representatives will not succeed in convincing us that the elimination of foreign bases constitutes a disturbance of their security. This thesis of theirs, incidentally, has not been explained. Indeed, it would be difficult to do so, because any attempt to put it in concrete form would reveal its aggressive nature.

After all, from the point of view of disarmament negotiations, the security of States can and should be identified first and foremost with the actual freeing of States from the danger of attack. This can only be achieved and ensured by disarmament.

The Western Powers have a different approach. They can only envisage existence in an armed world. Therefore they apparently try to identify the security of States with the defence capacity of States. But then the question arises: does the United States consider it necessary to safeguard its security from military bases located on foreign territory many thousands of kilometres away from the United States of America? We consider this to be an open manifestation of imperialistic aggressive plans. All these questions inevitably arise when one examines the reasoning of the representatives of the Western Powers on the subject of military bases on foreign territory.

The real purpose of United States military bases on foreign territory, and not only theirs but those of the United Kingdom and other Western Powers as well, is not, as they claim, to safeguard the security of States, but to have a larger number of offensive nuclear missile weapons on foreign territory. Why, for instance, does the United States need missile and air bases in Turkey? You may, of course, reply that these are provided for in mutual commitments. The question then arises: why are such commitments needed? For mutual defence? Against whom? Against the Soviet Union? But the Soviet Union proposes that both armed forces and all types of offensive and defensive weapons which could be used for an attack on other States or another State should be liquidated. Consequently you cannot use that pretext without coming into conflict with the true facts relating to the Soviet position and policy in these matters. These facts show that the argumentation of the Western Powers in this regard is completely groundless.

We are often told that adoption of the Soviet proposal would entail disturbing the existing balance in the military and strategic position. If it were adopted, the armed forces of the European States members of NATO would, it is alleged, be placed face to face with the armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty countries, which, in contrast

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to the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the Western States, constitute, as they say, a compact continuous mass on a single continuous geographical territory, whilst the armed forces of the European NATO States, the representatives of the Western Powers tell us, are in a strategically less favourable position, their territorial deployment having gaps in it and their numbers being less than those of the armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty States. All these Western arguments are groundless.

From the point of view of the nature and present state of modern armed forces, from the point of view of the nature of a possible modern war and the methods of waging it, these arguments, of course, do not stand up to criticism.

From the point of view of the particular nature of modern armed forces and their weapons, from the point of view of tactics, the art of military operations and strategy, it is hard to say definitely which is preferable - a compact mass of armed forces or a deconcentration of their components. It is no accident that, in connexion with nuclear missile weapons, the need has arisen to deconcentrate armed forces in the operational and strategic respect. On the other hand, the transport facilities of present-day armed forces is such that, depending on the existing operational and strategic situation, the operational and strategic position both of individual groups and of the armed forces as a whole can be changed quickly, in a matter of hours, not only within one theatre of military operations but even in a whole theatre of war. In confirmation of this one can say that at present, for example, a division of troops can be transferred from the United States to Europe by the latest military jet transports in 9 or even 7 hours. Within the bounds of a single theatre of war, and especially within those of a single theatre of military operations, these movements and regroupings can be carried out much more quickly and on a much larger scale. Therefore the references of the representatives of the Western Powers to geographical differences in the deployment of armed forces, and consequently to differences in their strategic situation, are far-fetched and, in any case, of no significance in the circumstances of today.

We have also frequently been told of the imbalance of armed forces which would arise in carrying out our proposal in the event of the elimination of military bases on foreign territory and the withdrawal of the armed forces of the United States and Canada to their own territory. In this connexion we were even given computations of

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the armed forces of the two sides taken from data of the British Institute for Strategic Studies. At various stages of our negotiations we have been compelled on more than one occasion to deal with this - save the mark - "argument" of "imbalance". Thus, for example, the Soviet representative, Mr. Zorin, speaking at the meeting of our Committee held on 18 July, quoted a statement made by the United States Secretary of Defense on 16 June 1962, which I must repeat once more:

"In manpower alone NATO has more men under arms than the Soviet Union and its European satellites." (ENDC/PV.59, p. 41)

I do not think I need add anything to this thesis of the United States Secretary of Defense.

I assume that Mr. McNamara knows this as well as anyone else. This was quite recently confirmed by the United States Under-Secretary of Defense, Mr. Nitze, also. The New York Herald Tribune of 20-21 April quoted him thus:

"World-wide NATO has 5.3 million men under arms, to a total for the Warsaw Pact countries of 4.3 million. NATO ground forces total 3.2 million, of whom 2.2 million are in Europe. Active army units of the Soviet Union, not counting the satellites, total about 2 million men."

Mr. Nitze went on to say that "The Russians cannot count on having clear superiority."

One is bound to ask: why, then, are the Western representatives here trying to confuse a perfectly clear issue and telling us that the Western Powers cannot agree to the elimination of the means of delivery because of their fear that the Soviet Union would then have a superiority in armed forces and conventional weapons? They are doing this in order to conceal their refusal to accept the Soviet proposals by invoking a completely groundless "argument" and one that is contrary to the facts.

On 3 April the Canadian representative, Mr. Burns, while analysing our proposal, tried to label it as imperialistic. Any other label is apparently beyond Mr. Burns' comprehension. He said that this Soviet proposal was a new theory of "minimum deterrence". He said:

"That theory of minimum deterrence has been extensively discussed in the West by scientists, political experts and others interested in disarmament" (ENDC/PV.117, p.8).

As we know, many different imperialistic militarist theories have been advanced in the West in recent years, such as the "retaliation theory", the "second strike theory", the "shield and sword theory", the "maximum deterrence theory", the "balanced

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reciprocal deterrence theory", the "containment theory", the "counterforce theory", the "preventive war theory", the "pre-emptive strike theory", the "geographical factor theory", the "balance of terror theory", and lastly the "minimum deterrence theory" just mentioned by Mr. Burns. This is only a part of what we have already heard in statements by various representatives and have read in various publications. Western strategists are so fond of fine-sounding words and formulae that we are not at all surprised that another "theory" should have appeared. But we - that is to say, the Soviet side - have never called and do not call this Soviet proposal a theory. It is a particularly practical proposal.

The Soviet Union did not put forward the proposal for the retention by the United States and the Soviet Union of a strictly limited number of missiles until the end of stage II because it was in favour of postponing the destruction of all missiles until the end of stage II. No; we considered, and we still consider, that the best solution of the problem is the destruction of all means of delivery, including missiles, already in stage I. However, having found that the Western Powers were not prepared to carry out such a measure, the Soviet Union then put forward its compromise proposal as a concession to the Western Powers. The Western Powers are now trying to label our compromise proposal as the "theory of minimum deterrence". But this appellation is purely imperialistic in its essence; it is in blatant contradiction without approach and our aims and with the substance of our proposal. We are opposed to any theory of deterrence, whether "maximum" or "minimum".

Therefore, dear Mr. Burns, do not try to distort our proposal by sticking your own label on it, or to complicate and confuse the issue with far-fetched concepts or mathematical computations such as those which you thought fit to put forward at one of the previous meetings (ENDC/PV.108, pp. 21 et seq.).

In your statement of 3 April (ENDC/PV.117, p.9), Mr. Burns, you used a quotation from a statement by Marshal Malinovsky and tried to ascribe to it a wholly different meaning. I have already answered you in one of my statements in that regard (ENDC/PV.120, pp.35 et seq.). But in connexion with the consideration of our proposal I feel bound to deal with it once again. Marshal Malinovsky's speech was not an intimidation or deterrent, as you said, Mr. Burns. It was a reply to the bellicose statements of the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara. But for some reason you passed over Mr. McNamara's statements in complete silence, Mr. Burns. In quoting Marshal Malinovsky you did not say a single word about the reason for our Defence Minister's statement. But that, as the saying goes, is a matter for your own conscience, Mr. Burns.

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In this connexion we are interested in something else: that, in putting forward this quotation you drew the conclusion that:

".... the great nuclear Powers are getting more and more into the situation that they would never use their enormous nuclear power unless the other side was about to attack them." (ENDC/PV.117, p.10).

That is a strange conclusion, to say the least. If one were to follow the logic of such arguments, one might go so far as to say that there is no need for us to bother about nuclear disarmament at all, since nuclear missile weapons are so monstrous, so terrifying, that the two sides, knowing this and fearing retaliation, would refrain from using them. Since this is so, Mr. Burns argues, then there is no need for us to bother about whether nuclear missile weapons will be in existence or not; rather, on the contrary, we must fight for the retention of nuclear missile weapons, as this would ensure peace. That is the Western theory of the "balance of terror". Consequently, in order to avoid a nuclear war, in Mr. Burns's opinion, all that is needed is constantly to maintain the balance of terror - that is, to continue the nuclear armaments race.

But that is the theory of the manufacturers of nuclear death. It is they who invent such amoral, inhuman theories, which guarantee them a continuous golden rain of profits from armaments orders. The truth is that, as long as nuclear missile weapons continue to exist, the threat of a nuclear missile war not only cannot be precluded but, on the contrary, will increase and will go on growing until it leads to a nuclear catastrophe. No, Mr. Burns, we do not agree with that philosophy of yours; we categorically reject it.

On 10 April the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, expressed himself in a rather different manner (ENDC/PV.120, p.16). He said that, even if the Soviet proposal were carried out, the threat of a nuclear missile war would still not be eliminated. But we do not agree with Mr. Godber's assertion either. It is quite unsubstantiated and does not merit being taken seriously.

The implementation of the Soviet proposal to eliminate nuclear weapon delivery vehicles as the material basis for a nuclear missile war would also lead to eliminating the possibilities of the outbreak of such a war.

On 20 March the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, said that the questions of nuclear weapons and conventional armaments should be discussed simultaneously or together. In explaining this, he said that it was not possible to discuss separately

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nuclear-capable and conventional armaments, because we have no clear definition of what constitutes each of those two groups of armaments (ENDC/PV.111, p.12). Mr. Stelle therefore concluded that the United States method of progressive across-the-board reductions of armaments had numerous advantages.

It must be recognized that Mr. Stelle's statement that we have no clear definition of what constitutes conventional types of armament and nuclear missile weapons is very peculiar and quite incomprehensible. That statement was evidently intended to confuse a clear issue and to avoid the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and military bases on foreign territory in stage I of disarmament. Only in this way can we understand this position of the United States representative.

The representatives of the Western Powers have again raised questions about the number of missiles to be retained. But we have already given exhaustive clarifications on that score at a number of previous meetings. I can repeat these explanations once again. As regards the number of missiles to be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States during stages I and II of disarmament, we propose that we reach agreement between us. But we have already explained to you the basis of principle of such an agreement, and this basis of principle is quite sufficient to enable you to give a definite answer to the Soviet proposal. I repeat, we have already submitted to the Committee the main information as regards the principle of the Soviet proposal. We envisage an agreed quantity - I repeat, an agreed quantity - of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and ground-to-air missiles.

The main criterion by which we propose to be guided in determining the number of missiles to be retained is this: I repeat, the number of missiles of the stated types and classes to be retained must be minimal - I emphasize minimal. The missiles to be retained are intended only to serve as an additional guarantee against possible aggression in case during the process of disarmament one of the parties should attempt to conceal, to hide away, some kind of missiles or other nuclear weapon vehicles. The number of missiles retained must be subordinated to the need to prevent the possibility of a nuclear missile war breaking out, and to this alone. That is our main concern. It means that the number of missiles retained must not be such that, possessing them, a potential aggressor could risk unleashing a nuclear missile war.

That is the meaning of the Soviet proposal. At the same time, the retention of a small, strictly limited and agreed number of missiles of the stated types and categories located only on the territories of the United States and of the Soviet Union

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would no doubt serve as a deterrent against any temptation to conceive aggressive plans or intentions, and would thus serve as a definite guarantee against possible aggression.

That is the real situation in regard to this question. It seems to us that this question is quite clear and does not call for any additional clarification. The way in which this question is stated shows the goodwill and constructive approach of the Soviet Union, which wants to solve this question jointly with its Western partners. We cannot understand the position adopted by the United States, which shuns this co-operation and is trying to conceal its reluctance to reach agreement by piling up various artificially-contrived questions.

I emphasize once again that, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we are ready to listen to any specific considerations of the Western Powers both as regards the number of retained missiles of the types and categories named by us, and specific questions concerning the procedure for the implementation of this measure. But all this, of course, must be decided solely on the basis of the criterion which we have stated, namely that the agreed number of missiles to be retained must be minimal, so that they could not be used to carry out any aggressive plans.

The pile of questions with which the representatives of the Western Powers have loaded the Conference table is a peculiar device by means of which they try to reject any proposal aimed at real disarmament. What we now need to get from the Western Powers is a simple and clear answer to the question: Do they or do they not agree to eliminate the danger of a nuclear missile war by eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, while the United States and the Soviet Union would retain a small, strictly-limited number of missiles of certain types until the end of stage II of disarmament? A positive answer to this question would provide grounds for continuing negotiations on every aspect of the questions which need to be agreed upon in connexion with this Soviet proposal.

In this connexion, I feel bound to reply to the argument of the United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason, that, as he put it, without an appropriate system of control we cannot be certain that the opposing side has not retained missiles over and above the agreed number and that it could not use civil aircraft or other means as nuclear weapon vehicles (ENDC/PV.117, pp.16, 17). Of course we envisage appropriate control. But let us assume that, even when appropriate control had been organized, a party violating the treaty not only decided to conceal but even succeeded in concealing a few missiles or in adapting a certain number of civilian aircraft as

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carriers of nuclear weapons. Would this mean that such a number of means of delivery would be added to the agreed small number of retained missiles that the party violating the treaty could decide to start a war with the hope of success? In modern conditions, a war in which nuclear missile weapons were used in any part of the world would become a world war.

Further, let us assume that an aggressor decides to start such a war. But once war is decided upon, all the necessary material must be provided for it. For this purpose the aggressor will need to have a large number of nuclear missile armaments and large armed forces. In such conditions even that would not be the main thing. Having once decided on such a war, the aggressor would have to use the concealed missiles and the vehicles adapted for carrying nuclear weapons in a sudden, massive and rapid strike so as to gain the maximum strategic advantage. The question naturally arises: could the aggressor use the vehicles adapted for carrying nuclear weapons suddenly and massively? The reply to this question can only be in the negative. An aggressor would not be able to use such means suddenly and massively in peace conditions, where there would be no military aircraft and only civilian types of aircraft would remain, and where strict international control would be kept over the disarmament measures. As a rule, all civilian aircraft fly singly, strictly to schedule, with previous notification and along definite routes. This is done throughout the world. There are special services in every State to control this system of flights. No deviation from the established routes, schedules and previous notifications, whether by separate small groups of two or three planes, say, or even by single aircraft, can pass unnoticed.

By using such aircraft singly and spaced in time one could not count on achieving any strategical, operational or tactical surprise with the use of nuclear weapons. This, in turn, would secure practically no advantage for the aggressor, and consequently it would not help him to achieve the aggressive aims with which he started the war. In the conditions where the practical use of imaginary hidden missiles or means adapted as nuclear weapon carriers cannot guarantee their being used suddenly and massively, there can be no question of achieving the strategic aims of war. It is beyond dispute that in these conditions no one will risk starting a war, and all the arguments of the Western representatives on this score are sheer speculation without any foundation, the only purpose of which is to avoid acceptance of this Soviet proposal. The considerations we have put forward are also a reply to a whole number of other questions raised by the Western representatives for the obvious purpose of avoiding having to give their own answer to this Soviet proposal.

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We hope that after these clarifications the Western representatives will take a serious attitude towards the disarmament negotiations and will give us a positive answer. We shall then be able to expect progress in the negotiations.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): The Gromyko proposal (A/PV.1127, provisional, p.38-40) has now had a fairly exhaustive consideration by our Conference, and in my view it would probably be most advantageous to our work if we were to move on to the next item on our agenda, which would allow us all time to consider the various points that have been put forward from both sides. That may be why our Soviet colleague complained at the beginning of his speech this morning that there were no Western spokesmen inscribed. He commented adversely on that silence from the West, and that was a little unfair of him. We did not comment adversely on Wednesday last, when I believe there was not a single speaker from the Soviet bloc on its own item, so I think it is a little disappointing that he should have taken that attitude. The Western representatives at that meeting (ENDC/PV.121) spent some time in dealing with this subject. Our Soviet colleagues were marshalling their speeches and answers at that time. We did not complain, and we have listened to them with interest this morning. So I do not think Mr. Tsarapkin should attach such dramatic importance to the silence of the West today. But lest he should, I think it might perhaps comfort him a little if I were to make a few remarks now.

I would only reiterate what I have said before on this question: that, subject to satisfactory assurances on a number of very important points - and they are very important points - we still think that the Gromyko proposal might have value for our work; but it would have value, in my view, if it were intended to take effect during the third rather than the second stage. In previous statements I have indicated why I think that, and I should not have felt it necessary to elaborate the point further now but for the interesting speech from our Polish colleague this morning in which he asked the West three particular questions (supra, p. 11). I think it is only a matter of courtesy to him that I should endeavour to reply to his questions; and, incidentally, I think the one question which our Soviet colleague asked (supra, p.15) was very much on the lines of one of those Polish questions. If, therefore, I do not reply specifically to Mr. Tsarapkin, I am sure he can get in touch with his Polish colleague concerning the answer I am about to give.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

The first question which our Polish colleague asked in this context was:

"Do you agree that what you call 'atomic protection' should consist of an equal number of missiles kept by the two sides?" (supra, p.11)

My answer is that certainly that might be possible during the later stages of disarmament. But, for the reasons which our Polish colleague himself gave this morning when he quoted Mr. Foster Dulles (supra, p.5), it would be well-nigh impossible during the early stages. He quoted Mr. Foster Dulles as saying that it was not practicable to equate the balance of military power. And because it is not so possible, then obviously it is not until we have gone substantially along the road to disarmament that we reach that particular point.

Admittedly the Polish representative quoted another United States Secretary of State later in his speech: he quoted Mr. Dean Acheson (supra, p.8). I think he talked about Mr. Dean Acheson having mentioned that some criterion of general application was necessary, and referred to certain countries requiring sufficient weapons for their defence. Yes, certainly. But for what defence? The whole point is, what would they require to be defending themselves against? And it depends entirely on what they fear a potential enemy might have to use against them.

Thus there is a direct relationship here. We cannot, in my view, seek to set up a mathematically-exact balance of power. I agree with Mr. Foster Dulles there. But we have, for this Conference, accepted the position that in fact there is at the present moment an uneasy balance of power; for what reasons, and in what degree, are points that may be discussed, but it exists. And we from the West have taken the position right from the start that it is no good trying to equate those things. One has to accept the position as it is and, pari passu, on both sides and at the same time, reduce until we come down near the level of zero. My answer to the first question, then, is that I think it is not realistic until we reach the later stages.

The second question which our Polish colleague asked was:

"Do you agree that this 'atomic protection' should be abolished at an agreed moment, but well before the end of the process of general and complete disarmament?" (supra, p.11).

I have already touched on that. Obviously such protection would have to be done away with at a precisely-agreed moment. That would be a very key moment in the whole disarmament process; and at that stage - I am sure we must all be agreed - peace-keeping forces, international peace-keeping forces, must have been established which can

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take over that responsibility at the time when the national forces cease to have the ability to do so. Nations cannot be expected to do away with their own individual element of security, which they provide for themselves, until they see that that international body has been set up and is effective.

In that context I think it only fair to point out that the Soviet Union does not envisage the peace-keeping forces coming into effect until the third stage. Therefore that is an added reason for bringing this proposal and this key moment of disarmament into the third stage of the total disarmament process. That, then, is my answer to the second question. I shall come to the third question in just one moment.

I have previously indicated my interest in Mr. Tsarapkin's slight elaboration of verification procedures when he said on 27 March:

"The Soviet Union is willing to agree to the establishment of control over the remaining missiles directly at the launching pads." (ENDC/PV.114, p.40)
I should like to make it quite clear again that, while I acknowledge this to be an advance, I have to say that it is only a very slight advance; and, without additional assurance against the clandestine retention of missiles, it is of only very limited value indeed. This morning Mr. Tsarapkin said to us, "Of course we envisage appropriate control." (supra p.19). Well, that may be so. But what he has told us so far does not seem to me to be adequate and effective control, which is what we need.

That brings me to our Polish colleague's third question, which seems to fit in here. He asked:

"Would you be prepared to accept the Gromyko proposal provided that a system of control acceptable to all were worked out jointly?" (supra, p.11)
I would say to him again that, as I have indicated on many occasions, at the appropriate stage this could be the basis of an arrangement to move away from reliance on our own individual nuclear umbrellas; but the verification arrangements must cover the whole question of clandestine weapons, and we have not had any really adequate answer to that yet.

The whole question of verification emerges again and again in all our discussions, and it is bound to continue to be a major stumbling-block to our Conference until the Soviet Union adopts a much more realistic approach. And I would emphasize here that, as I have said so many times, we ask from the Soviet Union no more co-operation with the inspectors of the international disarmament organization than we in the West are ready and eager to concede ourselves in the interests of promoting world peace.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

In passing, I would at this point interpose what I think is a perfectly fair question: Why is it always Soviet susceptibilities that have to be considered and allowed for? Why do we always have to consider what the Soviet Union could accept in this way? The proposals in question will pose very real problems for all our countries. To allow such complete freedom of inspection to international officials is a very big step. But we in the West are willing to face it and to accept those problems, not because we like it but because we honestly think that it is a price worth paying for a peaceful and disarmed world. It is the Soviet Union alone which apparently is not willing to pay that price.

We still have to know more about verification arrangements in connexion with the Gromyko proposal before it can have full credence. That is one more reason why, in the interests of the Soviet Union's own proposal, it could be better if the Soviet Union would consider it in relation to the third stage rather than the second. By that time the I.D.O. will have been functioning for some time; we shall all, I trust, have gained substantial confidence from the way it is functioning; and by that stage it should not be so difficult for the Soviet Union to accept that greater and fuller degree of verification which would enable one to satisfy oneself about clandestine arms, just as much as about other matters.

Our Soviet colleague did say this morning that of course a potential aggressor would need "to have a large number of nuclear missile armaments" and would not be able to use them "suddenly and massively" (supra, p.20). But would he need a large number? We all know sufficient to realize the ghastly effectiveness of such weapons. We recognize that the retention of a strictly-limited number does afford some degree of deterrence, and I shall come to that in a moment. But just how many surplus ones - over and above the mutually-balancing ones - would a potential aggressor really need? I suggest that it is not nearly such a large number as our Soviet colleague sought to make out today. Indeed, if it were, then that would negate the whole of his main argument, which we hear so much about, concerning the terrible nature of these weapons. We know that even a few could do devastating damage, and therefore that only a few extra would be required to give a country predominance. It would not necessarily have to use them; it would only need to disclose its possession of them at a critical moment and say that, if others did not obey it, it would use them. That is the danger, and it is a very real danger indeed; hence we have to be satisfied on this issue.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

It is true that our Soviet colleague came back again this morning (supra, p.20) to the question of hiding such bombs in commercial aircraft and that sort of thing, and showed that in that context it would not be significant. I agree with him that in that context it would not. Then we have discussed the subject in the past it has been in relation to the time when we shall have eliminated the orthodox nuclear delivery vehicles - the missiles which can carry the weapons most effectively. It is at that stage that the hiding of such weapons in commercial aircraft could become very relevant and dangerous. But we are not really discussing that particular point at this moment, and so I was rather surprised that our Soviet colleague brought it up this morning. I do not think it is entirely relevant to this argument while a number of the orthodox nuclear delivery vehicles are retained.

I should like to come back now to a matter which my delegation has referred to on several previous occasions: the concentration in the Gromyko proposal upon only land-based missiles being retained. I have always thought that rather strange, and I had rather expected that our Soviet colleague would have told us before now that his country was not necessarily wedded entirely to it. The United Kingdom delegation has reminded the Committee more than once that seaborne missiles have substantial advantages for both sides from the point of view of invulnerability, advantages which in our view ought not to be overlooked.

Although Mr. Tsarapkin has not yet dealt with that particular point, I think it might be helpful if I took a further look at the question of invulnerability. I do so because it is obviously related directly to the problem of how the protection to be provided by our respective nuclear umbrellas would work in actual practice during the first two stages of the Soviet disarmament plan (ENDC/2/Rev.1) - that is, on the basis of the Soviet Union's own proposal during the first two stages. I have made it quite clear that my own view is that it should go into the third stage. It seems to my delegation that if, as the Soviet Union has now proposed, we are going to count on the protection afforded by an agreed and strictly limited number of nuclear delivery vehicles on both sides, it will be of fundamental importance that such protection should be really sound. If the threat of punishment, to which Mr. Tsarapkin has referred on previous occasions, is to be absolutely sure, if inescapable retribution is to be absolutely certain, we shall have to be convinced by the Soviet delegation that the respective nuclear umbrellas which its Government now apparently envisages in stage II will be so to speak, leak-proof.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

In that context I should take up what our Soviet colleague said here this morning. I really found it rather difficult to follow his argument. At that stage of his speech he was, I think, taking Mr. Burns to task for saying that what was contemplated was a minimum nuclear deterrent. Mr. Tsarapkin said, "We are opposed to any theory of deterrence, whether 'maximum' or 'minimum'" (supra, p.16). That worried me very much, because if he is going to retain nuclear weapons and does not want them as a deterrent, there is only one thing for which he can want them, and that is aggression. I am very sorry if Mr. Tsarapkin is seriously telling us that the Soviet Union is keeping them for aggression, and I hope that that was not his meaning. He went on to say later that the number retained should be minimal (supra, p. 18) and must be subordinated to the need to prevent a nuclear war from breaking out. If that is not a minimum nuclear deterrent I frankly do not know the meaning of words, because that seems to be precisely what he was meaning. A minimum nuclear deterrent is a deterrent sufficient to prevent a nuclear war from breaking out. It seems to me that his words rather contradicted one another, and that therefore relieves him of the charge of seriously contemplating keeping these weapons for other purposes than as a deterrent. But why he has to be so coy about admitting that it is as a deterrent that he proposes keeping them, I frankly do not understand. It seems to me that the Gromyko proposal was in that sense an intelligible proposal and one which, as has been made clear to Mr. Tsarapkin, the West endorses in principle.

Clearly the first essential component of any minimum deterrent concept is that there is not the remotest possibility that one side could even begin to believe that it could successfully launch a surprise attack against the other and escape punishment. As I pointed out on 29 March:

"... if the calculation is that the attack is not worth while then the odds are that the attack does not take place." (ENDC/PV.115, p.39)

My colleague Sir Paul Mason made the same point on 5 April, when he said:

"If I happen to be aggressively-minded, I think I am less likely to carry out my evil intentions the more I realize that my potential victim possess a weapon system so invulnerable as to render -- in words which Mr. Tsarapkin himself has used in the past -- my punishment sure and my retribution inescapable." (ENDC/PV.118, p.54)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

The question of the invulnerability of nuclear weapon delivery systems is not, I would submit, so complicated as it might seem to be at first sight. However, it appears to have given rise to some misconception in the Committee, and is therefore a question to which we really ought to give attention. In fact, I think the simplest way in which to sum it up is to say that an invulnerable threat is always a deterrent to attack, but a vulnerable threat could in certain circumstances be a positive invitation to attack. I repeat that: an invulnerable threat is always a deterrent to attack, but a vulnerable threat could in certain circumstances be a positive invitation to attack. That, after all, is where the concept of the "pre-emptive" attack comes in. One cannot readily "pre-empt" against an invulnerable deterrent. That is the important point of the invulnerability of a particular weapons system.

In that connexion the Committee will recall that on 5 April the representative of Poland argued (*ibid.*, p. 13) that the invulnerability of a submarine force armed with Polaris missiles is not necessarily synonymous with its defensive character. I think that was the point he made, and I accept that argument. He went on to say that the character of such a force is determined by the policy it serves and for which it is constituted. That would seem reasonable as far as it goes. He suggested also that submarines equipped with Polaris missiles could very easily become instruments of surprise attack against the socialist countries. I am sure he would agree that certain other submarines could equally effectively be used against other countries.

On 19 April our Soviet colleague stated (ENDC/PV.122, p.28) that:

"Nuclear submarines equipped with Polaris missiles, just the same as stationary missile installations, are weapons of surprise attack."

(ENDC/PV.122, p.28)

He went a little further on that occasion than his Polish colleague. I would readily admit that any nuclear delivery system can in theory be used in an offensive role, just as much as it can be used in a defensive role. Obviously if someone had these weapons, and were determined to use them in whatever form they were, they could be used. Hence, nuclear submarines equipped with Polaris missiles could be used, as the Polish representative said, in an offensive role. But, as Mr. Tsarapkin himself suggested in the statement from which I have just quoted, fixed missile installations can also be used in an offensive role.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Needless to say, I sincerely hope that Soviet land-based missiles at fixed sites will not be used for surprise attack. On the other hand I should like to point out that there would be no point in trying to protect one's missiles from surprise attack if in fact one's intention was to fire those missiles first in a surprise attack. Therefore, if the West were planning to act aggressively, as has been claimed here, there really would be no point in the United States incurring vast expense and diverting valuable scientific and technical effort to the development of the seaborne Polaris delivery system. The Polaris missile on unprotected land sites would be just as effective an instrument of aggression. Why, therefore, bother to spend so much money on making that weapon invulnerable to surprise attack?

No: the advantage of Polaris missiles mounted in submarines lies in their invulnerability to surprise attack and, as I pointed out on 29 March (ENDC/PV.115, p.40), that development does make a really positive contribution to present world stability. I emphasize the word "present" because of course I am speaking of a passing phase until we can achieve agreement on general and complete disarmament. Obviously, both sides will continue to safeguard themselves in one way or another until we here reach the target set for us; but in the meantime it is better that a country be provided with invulnerable weapons than with vulnerable ones. So, until we achieve success, I do attach importance to this point: it does contribute actively to the reduction of the risk of war through accident or miscalculation, as I have said on previous occasions.

Incidentally, we in the West have noted with interest that the Soviet Union also is going to considerable trouble and expense to ensure that its own nuclear deterrent becomes as invulnerable as possible. Ought we then, I wonder, to conclude in view of the arguments that have been used here that it is doing so in order to launch a surprise attack on the West? I do not think so -- I hope not. I am not making the charges against our Soviet colleague that he so frequently makes against us; I merely point out that the Soviet Union is in fact doing this.

In order to put the whole matter in its proper perspective I think it would be worth while to draw the Committee's attention to the last of three recent and very interesting articles in Red Star -- a paper I recommend to our Soviet colleague -- about the development of science and military technology in the Soviet Union and the United States, particularly in the fields of naval missile technology and space

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exploration. I refer specifically to an article written by Captain Mamayev of the Soviet Navy, and broadcast in English on 4 April, in which Captain Mamayer stated that the strength of a navy, its strategic and operation potential, is determined --

"... not simply by the number of ships and planes but by their combat characteristics, the power of the weapons they carry, their equipment with modern technology ...".

And the article continues:

"In this sense the Soviet Union has the most modern navy in the world. It has weapons which enable it to solve successfully both operational and strategic tasks".

Captain Mamayev went on to say that the Communist Party and the Soviet Government were making every effort to give the Soviet Navy the most up-to-date weapons and technology and to arm it with the world's best atomic submarines. He said also that Soviet atomic submarines were armed with long-range rockets, among other things, and with nuclear warheads of great power, and that Soviet rocket submarines could use their weapons against shore military installations.

I think that article clearly shows that the Soviet Government is becoming increasingly aware of the advantage of mounting nuclear delivery vehicles on nuclear submarines in order to protect their invulnerability. As I have said earlier, this problem of invulnerability has a direct relevance to the Soviet proposal on the retention of intercontinental missiles.

As I understand that proposal, it specifically excludes the Polaris missile and, of course, its equally effective Soviet counterpart -- to which I have just referred -- also mounted on nuclear submarines. Moreover, it envisages the retention of intercontinental ballistic missiles exclusively on United States and Soviet territory. I take it that the word "territory" in this context does not include United States and Soviet territorial waters. Needless to say, I should be grateful if our Soviet colleague could confirm that my interpretation of the Soviet proposal as it stands is correct. If so, that leads me to two questions which I should like to ask Mr. Tsarapkin in that connexion.

First, I should like to ask him whether the Soviet proposal is a firm one in its specification of land-based ICBMs. And, secondly, if it is, then I should like to ask him if he will explain to the Committee why his Government does not include

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

seaborne missiles in that category; because, in our view, and apparently in the Soviet view as well, such missiles have advantages for both sides from the point of view of invulnerability.

I have dealt with the whole question of invulnerability at some length because I thought it sufficiently important to remind the Committee of the advantages of such a system now, and indeed in the period leading up to the final stages of general and complete disarmament. I have dealt also with the early stages, the difficulties of working down; but I believe this particular type of invulnerable missile would be as good as any to be retained until we reach that critical stage which I say should be reached during the third stage of the disarmament process.

If confidence in the genuinely defensive nature of the plans of others can be established in all our minds, then I believe it can advance our work here and help to lead on to the really major co-operation and mutual trust which we have not yet achieved, but which it is our duty to achieve and which, in fact, is essential before we can solve the immense problems of general and complete disarmament which still confront us.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation has listened with a great deal of interest to the lengthy statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union; and, of course, we intend to study it carefully to see whether we can find in it the clarification of the Gromyko proposal (A/PV.1127, provisional pp. 38-40) which has been asked for by us and by other Western delegations. We reserve our right to follow up our statement of today to see whether it is possible to develop further understanding of the proposal. But I wished to speak today because I understood the representative of the Soviet Union to imply that my remarks on 3 April indicated that the Canadian delegation believed that a deterrent was a good thing, and that a nuclear deterrent was something which would endure and should endure for an indefinite time. I think that if the representative of the Soviet Union, and any other representatives who may be under any misapprehension, will re-read the record of my remarks on that occasion, they will see that no such construction can be placed upon them. I said:

"It seems to me that the great nuclear Powers are getting more and more into the situation that they would never use their enormous nuclear power unless the other side was about to attack them." (ENDC/PV.117, p.10)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

I think that implies that both sides realize that that is not the kind of weapon which can be used by any rational government as an offensive weapon to advance its national policies. I went on to say:

"We now have a position of balanced deterrence but on an extremely high level. Furthermore, the balance is unstable, because of the continuing armaments race." (ibid.)

I do not think those words can be understood as being in favour of a continuation of deterrence; they point out that we now have deterrence, and imply that it would be desirable to reduce the level. I continued:

"The danger of a nuclear war can be reduced to a minimum by agreement between the great nuclear Powers to reduce their armaments and eventually eliminate them, under proper safeguards and with proper verification. But it is mutual confidence-building and the general agreement to stop the arms race which will provide safety -- not any specific measure, however ingenious." (ibid.)

I went on to say that we felt that the United States proposals were the most practicable yet advanced to reduce the danger of war in accordance with the Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5), and I ended by saying:

"If the Soviet Union, on the other hand, believes that there is a better method of achieving at an early stage of the disarmament process a balanced deterrent at a lower level than that which would result from the adoption of the United States outline of basic provisions, it is our view that it should explain the figures it has in mind and also the way in which it believes the minimal levels could be reached." (ibid., p.11)

We are unable to say that we have yet heard in any of the statements of the Soviet Union, including that made today, an explanation of how the Gromyko proposal would actually work. As I have said, we will read carefully what has been said today and hope that we shall find further clarification -- which, listening to the interpretation, we have not found. It has been put to the Western delegations that they should give clear answers to the proposal; but, as others who have spoken before me have asked, how can one give a clear answer to a cloudy proposal? We do not know what, precisely, the Gromyko proposal means; and as the Canadian delegation sees it, it is the duty of any delegation which advances a proposal in this Committee to make that proposal clear and to give sufficient explanations so that it can be understood by everybody.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Finally I would say that we hope that the proposal might be followed up in informal talks between the nuclear Powers, where it would be easier than in this more public forum to give explanations. Later we could hear the more definite proposal in the Committee. To our regret we have not yet heard anything which would make the proposal any clearer than it was on the day when it was enunciated by Mr. Gromyko in the United Nations General Assembly.

Mr. STELLIE (United States of America): Along with my United Kingdom colleague, I noted the opening remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union. Mr. Tsarapkin professed sadness at what he called the silence of the West with regard to Soviet proposals on the item we are discussing today. However, I thought I detected certain crocodile tears in that sadness, particularly when Mr. Tsarapkin went on to quote (supra, pp.15 et s.) and to repeat at length, the points which had been put forward by the delegations of the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy and the United States. While complaining of silence -- which he said was obstruction on the part of the West and boded ill for the future of the Conference -- he paid us the compliment of saying that we were loading the Conference table with a "pile of questions" (supra, p.19) Mr. Tsarapkin may not agree with all our words, but he can hardly accuse us both of silence and of loading the Conference table with a "pile of questions".

I should like to associate myself with the answers given by our United Kingdom colleague to the three questions posed by the representative of Poland. Without dwelling on them, I want to say a little more in that connexion about the quotation which the Polish representative made (supra, p. 5) from a statement by a former Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Dulles. Mr. Dulles said that the factors involved in military balance were so complex that it was not really possible to arrive at a dependable equation which would balance those factors against each other. I think that is a very good quotation from a very penetrating statement; and it is precisely because of that fact that the United States believes -- as do other Western Powers -- that the general approach to disarmament which it has proposed is a valid one. We do not think that we can arrive at a mathematical formula of the degree of military balance at the present time. All we can say is that each of the major sides has had the opportunity to use its resources to develop the kind of military strength which it

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

believes suitable to its own political, economic, geographical and strategic circumstances. We, for our part, are confident that the military strength and the military mix which we have built, and which we are continuing to improve, are adequate. From statements that we frequently hear from the Soviet delegation and from Soviet leaders, it is clear that the Soviet Union at least professes to believe that the military strength and the military mix which it has built are adequate.

While we cannot reach a mathematical equation indicating the military balance at this time, it is a balance which has been brought about through the free and unfettered exercise of our respective judgements and resources. That is where we start from. Our proposal rests on the assumption that if you start from a given situation, in which both sides have a given mix and given levels of military strength, and go down from that on a percentage basis, you will retain the balance with which you started. If, on the other hand, you try to work out each step in terms of an equation, you run into very great difficulties in negotiating each stage of the reduction and trying to agree on a hypothetical balance for each stage of the reduction. We believe that by percentage across-the-board reductions we can reduce our respective strengths eventually to zero and have neither side gain military advantage in the process of disarmament -- which is, after all, the sense of the key phrase in the paragraph so frequently cited from the agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (ENDC/5, para. 5). It is for that reason that we have advocated, as have the other Western countries here an approach to reduction of armaments which calls for progressive and balanced across-the-board percentage reduction of all major armaments in stage I. We believe that such an approach is the simplest, the most feasible and the most equitable.

As the Canadian representative has pointed out, we have not had any satisfactory answers to the questions we have asked the Soviet delegation about the proposal made by Mr. Gromyko in the General Assembly. As Mr. Burns said (supra, p. 32), for the most part we have no more information about what the Gromyko proposal means than we received when it was first presented in the United Nations. In view of the lack of detailed information it is of course, difficult if not impossible to give any really sound assessment of the proposal. However, while admittedly lacking information, I think there are certain preliminary conclusions that we might reach.

The Soviet proposal, unlike the percentage reduction that we advocate, seems to call for an immediate and drastic reduction, perhaps even at the very outset of

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

stage I, of one of the most important components of both Eastern and Western military forces. It seeks, in the very first stage of disarmament, to produce with respect to this most important component a result which under any well-balanced proposal could be obtained somewhere only very close to the end of the whole process of general and complete disarmament -- a process in which other elements of national military power would also have been reduced and the necessary peace-keeping arrangements established. The Soviet proposal provides for no gradual time-table of how we should get to the goal set, and it seems to be aimed at accomplishing this task in one fell swoop. Apart from all other relevant considerations, the Soviet Union's approach obviously raises a number of problems of a strictly practical nature, because it is quite clear that a task of such major proportions as that envisaged in the Soviet proposal, and the arrangements necessary to verify the implementation of that task, could not be carried out within the short period suggested by the Soviet Union.

Moreover, the Soviet proposal, as stated in article 5 of the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2/Rev.1), provides for the retention of certain categories of nuclear delivery vehicles which seem to have been selected arbitrarily, as the United Kingdom representative pointed out in one instance this morning (supra, p. 29). It completely disregards the present mix of armaments or composition of national forces in relation to what are loosely described as nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, on which nations possessing such vehicles have come to place so much military reliance within the framework of the totality of their forces. The Soviet proposal provides for the total elimination of those categories of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles on which the West, because of its particular geographic and strategic situation, is relying for defence to a greater extent than the Soviet Union seems to be; and, conversely, it calls for the retention of those vehicles on which the Soviet Union seems to be placing its primary reliance. Thus, in addition to proposing a radical alteration of the overall armament mix which nations have developed for their defence in accordance with their particular needs, the Soviet Union also seeks to modify in its favour even the residual mix of what could be generally classed as nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. We believe that the inequity and imbalance of such an arrangement is obvious.

The Soviet proposal contained in article 5 of the Soviet draft treaty, dealing with the question of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, is intimately linked to the proposals contained in articles 6, 7 and 8 of that draft, calling for the

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

total elimination respectively of military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear vehicles, of all surface and naval vessels capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons and all submarines regardless of class or type, and of all artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivering nuclear weapons.

Thus, as we have often said before, the Soviet proposals would entail a tremendous reduction in armaments even beyond those armaments which are primarily thought of as nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. The Soviet proposals would in effect eliminate practically all military aircraft and all surface warships -- not to speak of submarines, which would be totally eliminated regardless of their class or type. The same applies to a large extent, under the Soviet proposals, to artillery systems and to armoured forces. All in all, the Soviet stage I proposal, even with the Gromyko modification, provides for a vast and wholly impractical overloading of stage I, and that at a time when peace-keeping measures would not have been at all expanded to cope with the new international situation.

The same is true of verification, where the Soviet proposal also falls short of what the United States believes to be necessary for any sound proposal. We welcome even the timid step the Soviet Union has made towards meeting the need for providing assurance that agreed levels of armaments to be retained are not exceeded. But, as my delegation has previously stated, however welcome that step is, it is not adequate to provide sufficient assurance, because it leaves out the most important problem of giving the parties the assurance that no armaments are clandestinely retained or produced over and above the levels agreed for each of the steps on the way to our ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. My delegation has called upon the Soviet Union to extend the principle of verification of agreed levels to all measures involving the maintenance of such levels at the various stages of the disarmament process, and we hope to explore that general question further.

In addition to everything else, the Soviet proposal for the retention of an agreed and strictly limited number of certain delivery vehicles until the end of stage II is linked to such unacceptable proposals as those for the dismantling in stage I of all so-called foreign military bases and for the withdrawal of so-called alien troops from foreign territories, as provided in articles 9 and 10 of the Soviet draft treaty. Those two proposals, we believe, are quite clearly designed to undermine the defensive capabilities of the free world alliances and to alter the military balance

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

in favour of the Soviet Union. My delegation has explained its position on them on a number of occasions, and I shall refrain from dwelling further on them today.

On the basis of those considerations with regard to Foreign Minister Gromyko's proposal we believe that the proposal as now formulated, taken alone as well as in the context of other measures proposed in stage I of the Soviet draft treaty, would, if implemented, create grave imbalances in favour of the Soviet Union and to the disadvantage of the West. Consequently it conflicts, as we have said, with one of the basic principles set forth in the United States and USSR joint statement of agreed principles adopted in 1961, namely:

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all." (ENDC/5, para. 5)

Our comments today are of necessity based on the extremely limited amount of information available to us about Foreign Minister Gromyko's proposal. We would much prefer to appraise that proposal with full knowledge of the Soviet position. However, we have felt it useful to put forward our preliminary assessment, even on the basis of such insufficient information, hoping that any further clarification and elaboration which the Soviet delegation might give us would tend to attenuate the negative impression we now have of the proposal.

We are prepared to explore the subject further. However we believe, with our United Kingdom colleague, that perhaps the time has come for the Committee to move on to the next item of its agenda (ENDC/1/Add.3) on general and complete disarmament. We might refer items 5(b) and 5(c) to the co-Chairmen for further discussion, in accordance with our agreed procedure (ENDC/1/Add.1), after which they might again come back to the Committee. They have now been discussed for some time, and although my delegation is not satisfied that the Soviet delegation has yet explored them fully with us, we believe coming plenary meetings on general and complete disarmament might be appropriately devoted to item 5(d) of our agreed agenda, which deals with nuclear measures in stage I.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland): Since the next meeting devoted to problems of general and complete disarmament will be held in about two weeks, I think it might be advisable if I were to make a few comments on the statements made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States. I should like first of all to address my remarks to the last part of Mr. Godber's speech. I must confess that I have hardly heard a more eloquent plea in favour of the draft declaration on the liquidation of foreign bases equipped with offensive weapons (ENDC/75) pronounced by any delegation here present. If Mr. Godber is really consistent with his own words, he should sign that declaration here and now.

I should like now to revert to my quotation (supra, p. 5) from Mr. Dulles's speech of 22 July 1957. I must say that I thought I should have to defend the late Mr. Dulles only against Mr. Godber; now I see that I have to defend him also against Mr. Stolle. It is true that it is a very important statement, a very penetrating thought, with which my delegation agrees. Mr. Dulles says that it is impossible to find a dependable formula to evaluate the military power of the Soviet Union and its allies on the one hand, and the United States and its allies on the other hand. I should have thought that the logical conclusion that one could draw from that statement was that it was impossible -- practically impossible -- to base a programme of general and complete disarmament on the concept of a balance of power.

It seems obvious to me that, since a dependable formula cannot be established to evaluate the balance of military power, it is impossible to argue at the same time that that balance of military power can be maintained by percentage reductions. Either one accepts the premise that the balance of military power can be evaluated by some sort of a formula -- and then one reasonably argues that if that balance of military power is reduced by a certain percentage nothing will be changed; or one accepts the premise that it is impossible to provide a dependable formula for the evaluation of the balance of military power, in which case any percentage reduction can produce different effects. The United Kingdom and the United States delegations cannot have it both ways.

I should like to say a few words now about the remarks which the representative of the United Kingdom made in connexion with the questions which I had put to the Western representatives. The fact that we have two weeks before us before we revert to the problem of general and complete disarmament will give me ample time to study his statement. In any case, I should like to thank him for attempting to reply to the questions.

(Mr. Blusztain, Poland)

My first reaction is that his replies are highly unsatisfactory as far as my delegation is concerned. I think that they do not take into consideration, really, the problems which my questions were intended to raise. First of all, may I say that it seems to me that it is impossible to accept the concept of a programme of general and complete disarmament based on the idea of a balance of military power, and at the same time to reject the Gromyko proposal; because one can hardly imagine a concept more consistent with the idea of military balance than the concept of maintaining an equal number of missiles on both sides.

With regard to Mr. Godber's reaction to my second question, he says that it seems to him that the Gromyko proposal could well be implemented, but only as a stage III measure. I should like to draw his attention to the fact that, as far as we are concerned, we see the whole relevance of the Gromyko proposal only in so far as it is implemented right from the beginning of the disarmament proposal. Otherwise it has no relevance at all; because what the West is proposing now is really less than its own programme of general and complete disarmament.

If I take that programme as it stands now, the West says that the remaining part of the vehicles and so on will be destroyed at the third stage of the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament. I assume that at the third stage nothing will be left. What the West proposes now is to leave what it calls the atomic umbrella until the end of the implementation of the process of general and complete disarmament. Thus, I think I am right in concluding that what the West proposes to do with the Gromyko proposal is even less than it proposes itself in its own programme of general and complete disarmament.

I now have one or two words to say about Mr. Godber's reaction to my third question. It seems to me that it has to be said that the problem of control is, of course, very relevant. But it is not relevant only as far as our proposal is concerned; it is very relevant also in connexion with any other proposal regarding disarmament. We shall have to work out the control measures in common together, whatever measures of disarmament are finally agreed upon.

I should like to conclude my remarks now by saying that a Polish philosopher and writer once said, "I hope that, in the future, one day at least in a year will be set aside in which you will have to listen to the arguments of your opponent". I still hope that we may live to see that dream come true in our Committee.

Mr. TSARAFKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to make a few comments in connexion with the statement made by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, and the remarks of the Canadian representative, Mr. Burns, and the United States representative, Mr. Stelle.

I should like to begin with what has been said by the representative of Canada. He spoke to us in a general way, without adducing any proof, trying, as it were, in a half-joking way to avoid dealing with the Soviet proposal by calling it simply cloudy and unclear. I am not going to judge as to when the time will come for Mr. Burns when these proposals will become clear to him. It may never come, since it is hardly possible to explain this proposal of ours more clearly or more comprehensibly. The proposition is quite clear: to eliminate all means of delivery of nuclear weapons in stage I. What is not clear in this? Perhaps it is not clear to Mr. Burns, but in my opinion it is quite clear. Of course, I concede that he and his partners do not like this proposal; but that is a different matter, and it certainly does not mean that our proposal is cloudy and unclear. We are told that the Western Powers cannot agree to such a radical measure as the elimination of all means of delivery. Mr. Stelle spoke to this effect, and so did Mr. Godber. Your previous objections were based on the supposition: what if someone secretly hides a number of missiles, or reconverts some aircraft? You told us that you must have guarantees against such a thing happening, and that is why you cannot agree to the complete elimination of all means of delivery.

Having met with this attitude of the Western Powers, and in order to find some sort of basis for agreement, we, the Soviet Union, put forward at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly on 21 September 1962 a compromise proposal (A/PV.1127, provisional, pp.38-40) which took into account all these views of the Western Powers. This compromise proposal is very clear, and there is nothing cloudy about it. You consider that in the disarmament process, in the process of implementing the Soviet proposal, States should have some guarantee in case someone tries to violate the treaty. We do not believe in such a purely speculative, hypothetical supposition as that someone will violate the treaty when it comes to disarmament -- we do not believe in this. Yet you put forward such artificial doubts. Very well. Let us agree that the United States and the Soviet Union -- only these two countries -- shall retain a certain very small number of missiles on their own territories.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

I realize that if we had not put forward any principle or criterion by which we must be guided in order to determine the number of missiles to be retained, you would be entitled to say that the Soviet proposal is cloudy and unclear, that the Soviet proposal does not contain any principle or criterion to be used as a guide in determining this strictly limited number of missiles. But actually that is not the situation; our proposal contains a clear indication of what should be used as a guide in determining the number of missiles. We say that the number of missiles to be retained must be such that it would not allow a potential aggressor to think that he had any chance of attacking another State and gaining victory by crushing it.

That is the criterion which we propose; but you completely ignore this fact, pass over it and without any grounds whatsoever continue to assert that the Soviet proposal is unclear and cloudy. No; the Soviet proposal is perfectly clear and definite. We say to you: "Here is the criterion; here is the basic approach to the solution of this question." As far as the specific numbers are concerned, let us sit down together at the table and reach agreement. You will name your figures, and we will name ours. But first we have to agree on whether you accept our proposal. You are obviously avoiding accepting it. Mr. Godber said to us: "Let us not overload stage I." Mr. Stelle said exactly the same: "Let us not overload stage I of disarmament with radical and far-reaching measures." The United States and United Kingdom do not want radical measures, which would prevent the unleashing of a nuclear missile war, to be carried out at the beginning of disarmament, in stage I.

That is the meaning of your objections, and not because the proposals of the Soviet Union are unclear and cloudy, Mr. Burns. It is a strange situation. When the Soviet Union proposes that something specific, real and radical should be implemented in the very first stage, so that all the peoples of the world should feel that disarmament is really taking place, the Western Powers tell us that this would overload the first stage. And what do they themselves do? They put everything off till stage III.

That is what Mr. Godber and Mr. Stelle told us today. Is it possible to overload the third stage? After all, they do not in fact propose solving anything in a radical way either in stage I or in stage II, but say to us: "Let us do everything in stage III". Where, then, is your logic; where is your consistency? We must not overload stage I, but we can overload stage III! No, in reality that is an evasion of the problem of disarmament and nothing else.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Mr. Stelle said that the Soviet proposal of 21 September was not balanced, that it upset the balance of forces, that it was unfair and involved an enormous reduction in armaments. He said that it would be a heavy and impractical load for stage I.

All these remarks are unfounded -- I have already replied in regard to overloading stage I. But in what way do you find our proposal unbalanced? And in what way does it upset the military balance? In what way is it lopsided? We are proposing to retain a small and agreed number of missiles; consequently neither you nor we will allow the retained number of missiles to be unbalanced. We propose reaching agreement that, as a guarantee against a possible violation of the disarmament agreement by any of the parties to it, we should retain a small, agreed number of missiles.

But we must remember that if we sign a disarmament treaty in which the disarmament measures are laid down in stages, this will be a process which will be under the scrutiny and control of millions, tens of millions, or even hundreds of millions of eyes throughout the world. And it is frivolous when we are told that apparently someone is going to hide a missile the size of a ten-storey house and no one will know about it. Just try to hide a Titan or Saturn missile, so that no one would know, after the whole of mankind knows that there are so many missiles left in all in the Soviet Union and so many missiles in the United States, and nobody else should have any; just try to hide them then. After all, the whole world will know about this agreement. And those interested in control over its strict observance will be not only the inspectors invested with an official mission, but in fact the whole of humanity, hundreds of millions of people. Just try to hide something.

This is a purely speculative supposition in order to evade the issue and its solution -- to bog down the solution of this problem by putting forward such purely artificial, hypothetical situations and speculative suppositions. This is the only way to explain such an attitude to the Soviet proposal. We consider the position of the Western Powers to be unsatisfactory. We shall insist on the solution of this question, because only the solution of this question can prevent the outbreak of a nuclear missile war.

You put forward proposals: "Let us agree against the outbreak of war by accident"; but do you allow an outbreak of war that is not by accident? No, we must fight here both against an outbreak of war by accident and against an outbreak that is not by accident. And we shall not allow you to reduce everything to a joke and to play a comedy.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Any measure which is a radical one and really leads to disarmament you immediately reject, either by putting numerous questions or by declaring that the measure is unbalanced, lopsided, overloads the first stage, and so on. What is it you want, gentlemen?

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): As it is so late, I shall keep the Committee for only one moment. I have listened with interest to the flow of eloquence we have just had, and I do not wish to comment apart from dealing with two points.

On one of them I think our Polish colleague clearly misunderstood what I had said. He said he would have a fortnight in which to consider it. When he has read the record of what I did say, he will no doubt understand it correctly. He was claiming (supra, p. 38) that I had said that we would leave until the very end of the third stage this question of reaching a balance of a strictly limited number. Of course, I said nothing of the sort. I said "during" the third stage (supra, p. 30). It is useless for representatives of the Soviet bloc to speak all the time as if at the moment when a stage began a button was pressed and the whole of the operations of that stage took place at once. They do not. They cannot. They never will. Let us have a little realism in the Committee. In fact, the first stage will occupy a considerable period; the second stage will also, and so will the third. The point I was making was that during the third stage that critical point will be reached, and that is where I believe this particular proposal could well be of value. So much for that point. I hope my Polish colleague will study what I did say, and then no doubt he will come back to it later.

As for our Soviet colleague, he accused us (supra, p. 40) of departing from logic. To tell the truth, I thought that he went quite a long way from logic himself during his statement. What did he say? At one stage he said that we are all the time talking of overburdening the first stage and yet want to overburden the third stage. But we do not want to overburden the third stage at all. The Western plan (ENDC/30) is to have a reduction of 30 per cent in the first stage, 35 per cent in the second stage, and 35 per cent in the third stage. I would have thought that that was not overburdening any particular stage from the point of view of reduction.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I did make the point that, by the time we reach the critical stage of coming down to and below a minimum nuclear deterrent, we must have our peace-keeping forces adequately provided. I made that point, and I think that it is an essential corollary to the Soviet proposal, and one to which our Soviet colleague has certainly not given sufficient attention in anything that he has said to us.

As to his other points, I really do not think we deserve the strictures he passed on us; but, as the time is late, I shall not seek to go into them further. I would only make one minor complaint that it is so terribly difficult to satisfy our colleagues from the Soviet bloc. What did we hear this morning? We heard our Soviet colleague saying to us, "It is monstrous that you in the West remain silent when you should be speaking this morning". Yet our Polish colleague, right at the end of his statement (supra, p. 33), quoted to us a proverb begging us to remain silent and to listen to our opponents. Well, really, gentlemen, as our Polish colleague said to us (supra, p.37) you really cannot have it both ways. If you want us to remain silent one day, tell us; but do not then accuse us of insincerity in remaining silent. So I leave it to our Polish and Soviet colleagues to settle this difference between themselves.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland): My English may not be perfect, but I still believe that what I said was quite clear. I never invited Mr. Godber to keep silent. I know that would be beyond my reach anyway.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and twenty-fourth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Kurka, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Czechoslovakia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Poland, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 26 April 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.

